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Abstract
Background: Informal payments for health care are common in most former communist countries. This paper
explores the demand side of these payments in Albania. By using data from the Living Standard Measurement
Survey 2005 we control for individual determinants of informal payments in inpatient and outpatient health care.
We use these results to explain the main factors contributing to the occurrence and extent of informal payments
in Albania.
Methods: Using multivariate methods (logit and OLS) we test three models to explain informal payments: the
cultural, economic and governance model. The results of logit models are presented here as odds ratios (OR) and
results from OLS models as regression coefficients (RC).
Results: Our findings suggest differences in determinants of informal payments in inpatient and outpatient care.
Generally our results show that informal payments are dependent on certain characteristics of patients, including
age, area of residence, education, health status and health insurance. However, they are less dependent on
income, suggesting homogeneity of payments across income categories.
Conclusions: We have found more evidence for the validity of governance and economic models than for the
cultural model.
Keywords: Public health care, informal payments, economic transition, governance, Albania
Background
Informal payments to health service providers are wide-
spread not only in the former communist countries
(Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union),
but also in other middle income and developing coun-
tries [1-6]. These unregulated out-of-pocket payments
are often labelled as ‘under the table payments’, ‘envel-
ope payments’, ‘under-the-counter payments’, ‘gifts’, and
even ‘black money’. They are usually defined as pay-
ments made to health care providers for services which
are supposed to be provided at no charge to the patient
[4] and may take different forms, from cash payments to
in-kind contributions and from gift giving to informal
charging [6].
Informal payments in health care can be conceptua-
lised as a strategy to cope with lack of resources and
poor performance at both the demand and supply side
[4,7]. Patients may pay informally to jump the queue, to
receive higher quality of services or more care [4,7,8].
Providers may use informal payments to raise their low
salaries.
Informal payments were very common in Albania in
2005, especially in inpatient health care, which because
o fs t a t ef u n d i n gw a so f f i c i a l l yf r e eo fc h a r g ef o rt h e
entire population. The situation was particularly dra-
matic for people in the lowest quintile of income distri-
bution [9].
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influence informal payments for outpatient and inpatient
care. We test three models (i) the cultural model, (ii)
the economic model and (iii) the governance model to
explain the occurrence and extent of informal payments
i nA l b a n i a .I no u ra n a l y s i sw em a k eu s eo ft h eA l b a n i a
Living Standards Measurement Survey (ALSMS) of
2005. Our intention is to explore who pays, for what,
how much, and when is the payment voluntary or
requested/expected.
Methods
The causes and origins of informal payments have been
a topic of frequent discussion. Various factors have been
suggested to explain informal payments including: a) the
culture of gifts [7,10,11]; b) the low salary of medical
staff [12-16]; c) the lack of resources and material sup-
plies [10,13,14]; d) the bargaining power of medical staff
relative to patients [17,18]; and e) the lack of regulation
and unresponsiveness of the government [13,15]. We
base our theoretical framework on the main explanatory
factors for informal payments identified by Gaal and
M c K e e[ 1 9 ] .W eg r o u pt h e mi nt h r e em o d e l s :( i)t h e
cultural model, (ii) the economic model, and (iii)t h e
governance model (see also Table 1).
The cultural model considers informal payments a
particular type of behaviour where care seekers express
their gratitude in the form of gifts. Such behaviour is
found in many countries, in particular in Mediterra-
nean, CEU and FSU countries. The ‘culture of gifts’
roots in values and traditions [11] and is conceptua-
lised as institutionalised behaviour of patients. Seen as
voluntary behaviour, it is sometimes argued that it
does not put any particular burden on them. The value
of gifts is supposed to be modest and directly linked to
their ability to pay. Payments are expected to improve
the motivation of the medical staff, ensure a personal
relation, and provide incentives for physicians to feel
appreciated [5].
A good strategy to measure the culture of gift is to ask
patients about their attitude to gift payments in health
care and the amount they would consider appropriate.
Unfortunately, the ALSMS 2005 does not contain data
on the patients’ attitude. Therefore, we used proxy indi-
cators. Typical for the culture of gift is that informal
payments are widespread and perceived as voluntary.
Furthermore, we expect the amount paid to be relatively
low compared to the total amount paid out-of-pocket.
There is also a positive correlation between the patient’s
income and the amount paid.
The economic model conceptualises informal pay-
ments as the result of a gap between demand and sup-
ply (lack of financial resources). The communist regimes
established in CEE and FSU countries after the Second
World War propagated free access to health care policy
under the legacy of the ‘Shemasko’ health care system.
Free access boosted the demand for health care which
in turn caused a shortage of supply [19]. After the fall of
communist regimes, governments in these countries
were not capable to maintain an inefficiently operating
health care system that guaranteed free access to all
patients. With state revenues declining in many CEE
and FSU countries in the early 1990s, health expendi-
tures also dramatically fell. Due to political circum-
stances the number of staff and beds remained largely
unchanged [13,15]. The inevitable result was a large
health system with underpaid and sometimes even
unpaid staff. Albania’s limited public spending on health
care sector has resulted in an increased reliance on out-
of-pocket payments for both inpatient and outpatient
care [20]. According to the WHO, in 2005 out-of-pocket
expenditures accounted for 59.8 percent of Albania’s
total health expenditures [21]. Furthermore, a rural-to-
urban brain drain [22] caused a physician shortage in
rural areas and small towns (especially in inpatient
care). The mismatch between demand and supply in
health care and the unresponsive character of the health
system led to a situation in which patients used informal
Table 1 Causes of informal payments and observed effects
Models Causal factor Observed effects
1. Cultural 1. Culture of gratitude gifts and tipping 1. Money and in kind gifts paid to medical staff (usually after the services received).
2. Patients declare gifts to medical staff mostly as voluntary.
3. A relatively moderate incidence of such payments, usually of modest value.
2.
Economic
1. Demand side factors
-free heath care access
2. Supply side factors
-Inadequate funding
-Low salaries of health care staff.
-Investments oriented more towards access
rather than quality of services.
1. Unequal amounts paid for inpatient and outpatient health services.
2. Informal payments resemble a ‘fee-for-service’ model (as patients may use
informal payments as top ups or for getting better quality of service).
3. High income patients will pay higher informal payment.
4. Having health insurance will lower the probability of paying informally.
3.
Governance
1. Lack of control and accountability leading to
unethical behaviour of medical staff.
2. Weak rule of law and corruption control.
1. High incidence of explicitly requested payments.
2. Probability of paying informally is dependent on the knowledge and bargaining
power of the patients.
3. Low numbers of prosecuted cases of corrupted medical staff.
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used informal payments to increase revenues. Due to
political circumstances the situation further worsened
by the fact that investments continued to be more
access-driven than quality-driven [20]. Patients were
more willing to pay extra for what they perceived as bet-
ter quality of care.
In the economic model we expect informal payments
to be higher in inpatient care than in outpatient care.
This expectation rests upon the assumption that the
severity of illness of patients who need outpatient care
is on average less than the severity of illness of patients
in need of inpatient care. Informal payments are also
expected to be higher for hospital doctors than for gen-
eral practitioners. Informal payments will also positively
correlate with income. Patients who are covered by
health insurance will be less willing to make informal
payments, because they know they have already paid for
medical care.
Informal payments may also point to poor governance.
The governance model links informal payments to lack
of control and accountability in health care, weak rule
of law and widespread corruption [19]. Each of these
factors elicits non-ethical behaviour of the medical staff.
Patients are not protected by public authorities and, as a
consequence, are more exposed to exploitation from
physicians. In spite of their official commitment to the
professional model which states that patient interests
should always prevail over the physician’s economic
interest [23,24], physicians are tempted to abuse the
asymmetric physician-patient relationship to increase
their earnings [17,18].
If informal payments are the result of poor govern-
ance, we expect (i) a high incidence of explicitly
requested payments (direct payments to physicians are
forbidden by law in Albania: therefore, asking explicitly
for a gift/payment can be taken as an indicator of
unethical behaviour), (ii) the probability of informal pay-
ments to be related to the knowledge and bargaining
power of patients (people with low education will have
less negotiating power and may therefore easily be
exploited by medical staff), and (iii) tolerance of corrup-
tion (i.e. number of prosecuted cases for corrupt medi-
cal staff is very low).
Our data were taken from the Albania Living Standard
Measurement Survey 2005 which is freely accessible on
the World Bank’s website (http://www.worldbank.org/
lsms). ALSMS uses a stratified sample and distinguishes
four main areas; Tirana (the capital of the country) and
three other agro-ecological/economic areas (Coastal,
Central and Mountainous). The survey is representative
for Tirana and the other three areas as well as for
urban-rural areas [25]. The numbers of households
sampled in 2005 is 3640 (17302 individuals). Data are
collected both for individuals and households and vari-
ables concern demographic, social and economical char-
acteristics. The data set includes detailed information on
households’ income and expenditures for housing, food
consumption, education, and so on.
The set of questions of our interest refers to whether
individuals utilised health care in the past period (4
weeks for outpatient care and 12 months for inpatient
care). Information on informal payments concerns the
total amount paid to the medical staff
1 and the volun-
tary or requested character of these payments. Out of
the total sample, 2244 individuals reported to have
received outpatient care (1591 in public ambulatory
clinics and 653 in hospital outpatient departments) and
710 inpatient care. Data collected by the ALSMS 2005
include all informal payments under “gifts paid to medi-
cal staff”. Table 2 gives a complete overview of the vari-
ables used in our models.
In order to investigate the determinants of informal
payments in inpatient and outpatient care we estimate a
logit model to analyse the probability of payments and
an OLS model to analyse the amount paid. In our analy-
sis we try to distinguish between gratuities and informal
payments by controlling for their main drivers and esti-
mating a separate model controlling for the voluntary/
requested character of them. Our models are estimated
separately for inpatient and outpatient care (see also
Table 3). Inpatient care includes all visits in public hos-
pitals over the past 12 months and outpatient care all
visits in public ambulatories and outpatient departments
of public hospitals during the past 4 weeks
2.I n f o r m a l
payments for inpatient care are measured as the average
amount paid per day and informal payments in outpati-
ent care as the average amount paid per visit.
To understand informal payments better, we further
investigate the relationship between informal payments
for inpatient and outpatient care. Are persons who pay
f o ro n et y p eo fs e r v i c em o r el i k e l yt op a yf o rt h eo t h e r
type as well? Are the amount paid for inpatient and out-
patient care correlated? To answer these questions, we
investigate the correlation of the residuals of our logit
and OLS models (see Table 4).
Results
The results from logit and OLS models are given in
Table 3. Our findings indicate that the incidences and
the amounts paid informally to medical staff vary across
patient categories.
Elderly patients seeking outpatient health care had a
slightly lower probability of paying informal payments
(OR = 0.99; p-value = 0.048). The demand for health
care rises with age and therefore the elderly were more
likely to need health care. They were also more likely to
have health insurance (e.g. universal coverage for
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(World Bank, 2006). In our model, both factors lowered
the probability of informal payments for outpatient care.
The probability of informal payments for inpatient care
was also slightly lower, but not statistically significant
(OR = 0.99; p-value = 0.750).
Patients living in rural areas and visiting outpatient
care seemed more likely to make informal payments
than patients living in urban areas (OR = 1.22; p-value
= 0.090). They also paid more informally than patients
living in urban areas (RC = 0.121; p-value = 0.027). In
2005, many of the health care centres in rural areas
were non-functional or did not even offer basic services
[9]. As a consequence, most people living in these areas
preferred the facilities in big urban centres, where, due
to absence of a referral or social connections, the pres-
sure to pay was higher [16]. A slightly different situation
was observed for inpatient care (though results were not
statistically significant). Here, those living in rural areas
seemed less likely to pay (OR = 0.96; p-value = 0.884),
but more likely to pay higher amounts (RC = 0.017; p-
value = 0.928) than patients living in urban areas. For
these patients the treatment was associated with addi-
tional opportunity costs (travelling, accommodation
expenses for the relatives accompanying, etc) and the
medical staff seemed to take more advantage of such
aspects.
The not statistically significant role of income for
explaining the probability of informal payments in out-
patient and inpatient care (OR = 1.05; p-value = 0.524;
OR = 1.08; p-value = 0.459) and the amount paid infor-
mally (RC = 0.075; p-value = 0.195; RC = 0.110; p-value
= 0.207) indicates that all patients were likely to be
affected by informal payments regardless of their
income.
Patients with health insurance were less likely to pay
informally for inpatient (OR = 0.78; p-value = 0.041)
and outpatient care (OR = 0.54; p-value = 0.001) than
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
The incidence of paying informally The amount paid informally
Variables Outpatients
services
Inpatients services Outpatients
services
Inpatients services
Amount paid informally (in Lek) * - - - - 658.042 (2473.042) 1298.988 (2499.494)
Household size 4.594 (1.994) 5.028 (1.935) 4.731 (2.100) 5.249 (2.060)
Age of the individual 46.679 (24.573) 40.699 (22.818) 42.882 (25.413) 39.040 (23.211)
Gender (Female = 1) 0.583 (0.493) 0.577 (0.494) 0.617 (0.487) 0.599 (0.491)
Urban/Rural (Rural = 1) 0.450 (0.498) 0.557 (0.497) 0.519 (0.500) 0.590 (0.492)
Income/capita 9160.373 (7277.878) 8016.400 (6121.248) 8644.299 (6552.127) 7900.646 (6211.548)
Health Insurance (Without health insurance = 1) 0.625 (0.484) 0.486 (0.500) 0.540 (0.499) 0.404 (0.491)
Health rate (1 ‘v. poor’ -5‘v. good’) 2.932 (0.983) 3.151 (1.149) 2.993 (0.979) 3.189 (1.152)
Chronic illness (Chronic illness = 1) 0.663 (0.473) 0.472 (0.500) 0.608 (0.489) 0.421 (0.494)
Without education (Without education = 1) 0.011 (0.105) 0.004 (0.067) 0.013 (0.114) 0.003 (0.053)
Education 8-years (Education 8-years = 1) 0.523 (0.500) 0.581 (0.494) 0.554 (0.498) 0.588 (0.493)
Secondary education (Secondary education = 1) 0.200 (0.400) 0.204 (0.403) 0.175 (0.380) 0.186 (0.390)
University education (University education = 1) 0.055 (0.227) 0.045 (0.207) 0.015 (0.123) 0.045 (0.208)
Hospitals in Tirana (Visiting in Tirana hospital = 1) - - 0.323 (0.468) - - 0.302 (0.460)
Hospital in the same district (Visiting in the same hospital
district = 1)
- - 0.528 (0.500) - - 0.599 (0.491)
Hospital in different district (Visiting in the different hospital
=1 )
- - 0.124 (0.329) - - 0.096 (0.295)
Hospital in foreign country (Visiting in foreign country
hospital = 1)
- - 0.025 (0.157) - - 0.003 (0.053)
Rural/Urban * Hospital in Tirana district (Rural patient visit
in Tirana hospital = 1)
- - 0.128 (0.335) - - 0.124 (0.330)
Nr of times visit outpatients care/Days stayed in Hospital 1.393 (0.933) 16.171 (20.154) 1.418 (0.966) 15.477 (17.744)
The incidence of paying informally (Paying informally = 1) 0.233 (0.423) 0.528 (0.500) - - - -
The incidence of voluntary/requested payments (Requested
payments = 1)
- - - - 0.617 (0.487) 0.686 (0.465)
Number of Observations 1963 671 457 354
Note: *) In inpatient care the amount paid informally is the average per day in hospital.
In outpatient care the amount paid informally is the average per visit.
Standard errors are in bracket
100 ALL = 0.80 Euros in June 2005
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bargaining power in interacting with the medical staff.
Such patients knew the rules of the game in hospitals
and were better informed on what is covered. Figure 1
and Figure 2 show the probability of paying informally
in outpatient and inpatient care for all age groups with
or without health insurance. Younger contributors were
more likely to pay, while health insurance reduced the
probability of informal payments across all ages. How-
ever, we believe that the particular form of service con-
tracting and the financing in outpatient services shaped
the curves differently. Older patients were less likely to
pay informally for outpatient care than for inpatient
care. Health insurance reduced this probability in outpa-
tient care as this care was mostly funded by Health
Insurance Institute. The probability of informal pay-
ments remained high for inpatient care.
Patients with lower score on self-reported health were
more likely to make informal payments in inpatient care
than other patients (OR = 0.83; p-value = 0.074). The
same also holds for patients with chronic illnesses com-
pared to patients with acute diseases (OR = 0.65; p-
value = 0.077). However, both groups seemed to pay
lower amounts for inpatient care.
Patients with chronic illness were more likely
requested to make an informal payment for outpatient
care than all other patients (OR = 1.73; p-value = 0.065)
and lower educated people were more likely requested
to make an informal payment for inpatient care (OR =
1.84; p-value = 0.061) than people with secondary or
university education. A similar result was found for
rural residents treated in Tirana’sh o s p i t a l s .R u r a l
patients seeking inpatient care in Tirana (the capital of
the country and the only city offering tertiary care) were
also more likely requested/expected explicitly by the
medical staff to make an informal payment than urban
patients (OR = 2.79; p-value = 0.096).
People with university education were less likely to
pay in outpatient care (OR = 0.29; p-value = 0.003), but
paid a higher amount for inpatient care (RC = 1.025; p-
Table 3 Logit and OLS estimations of the probability and the amount paid as informal payments to medical staff
Odds ratio of paying informally
to Medical Staff
The amount of informal
payments paying to Medical
Staff
Odds ratio if informal
payments have been voluntary/
requested by Medical Staff
Outpatient
service
Inpatient
service
Outpatient
service
Inpatient
service
Outpatient
Service
Inpatient
service
Household size 0.996 (0.030) 1.112** (0.050) 0.024 (0.022) -0.071** (0.035) 0.870*** (0.047) 0.939 (0.061)
Age of the individual 0.994** (0.003) 0.999 (0.005) 0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.004) 0.994 (0.006) 0.989 (0.007)
Gender 1.166 (0.131) 1.136 (0.190) 0.043 (0.087) 0.019 (0.144) 0.598** (0.128) 0.771 (0.203)
Urban/Rural 1.226* (0.147) 0.968 (0.215) 0.202** (0.091) 0.017 (0.192) 1.375 (0.303) 1.350 (0.465)
Log income/capita 1.046 (0.075) 1.080 (0.112) 0.075 (0.057) 0.110 (0.087) 0.733** (0.107) 0.914 (0.151)
Health insurance 0.782** (0.094) 0.542*** (0.101) -0.375*** (0.091) -0.071 (0.164) 0.998 (0.224) 0.962 (0.293)
Health rate (1 ‘v. poor’ -5‘v. good’) 0.993 (0.069) 0.827* (0.089) -0.033 (0.058) 0.292*** (0.094) 0.898 (0.126) 0.789 (0.139)
Chronic illness 0.980 (0.155) 0.654* (0.157) -0.030 (0.123) 0.388* (0.217) 1.733* (0.515) 1.291 (0.515)
Education primary 1.124 (0.166) 1.074 (0.229) -0.091 (0.114) -0.092 (0.184) 1.417 (0.382) 1.839* (0.597)
Education university 0.292*** (0.120) 1.332 (0.558) 0.195 (0.353) 1.026*** (0.357) 2.783 (2.502) 1.167 (0.748)
Hospital in Tirana district 0.943 (0.228) 0.253 (0.214) 0.706 (0.263)
Rural/Urban x Hospital in Tirana district 1.044 (0.370) 0.231 (0.313) 2.785* (1.714)
Nr. of times visit outpatient health
service/Days stayed in hospital
1.064 (0.061) 0.998 (0.004) -0.037 (0.044) -0.033*** (0.004) 0.892 (0.094) 1.006 (0.009)
Log informal amount paid - - - - 1.197 (0.140) 1.663*** (0.177)
Constant 5.184*** (0.715) 4.627*** (1.134)
Number of observations (N) 1963 671 457 354 457 354
R-squared 0.2191 0.3088
Pseudo R2 0.0257 0.036 0.0001 0.0001
Note: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *. Standard errors are in bracket
Table 4 Correlation of residuals from the probability and amount models
Logit of paying informally in Inpatient service Amount paid informally in Inpatient service
Logit of paying informally in Outpatient services 0.648** (247) n.a.
Amount paid informally in Outpatient service n.a. ’’0.006 (60)
Note: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *. Numbers of observations are in bracket
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have health insurance (because of their formal employ-
ment) and also earned higher income. They were better
covered in outpatient care, where the role of health
insurance was stronger, but their higher informal pay-
ments in inpatient services suggested that they were
purchasing upgrades and/or more attention. When test-
ing whether these payments were voluntarily or
requested, we found that patients with primary educa-
tion were more frequently requested to pay informally.
When testing for the location of the hospital, the
results suggested that informal payments were more
likely higher in Tirana’s hospitals (RC = 1.026; p-value =
0.238). This result is not very surprising. Hospitals in
Tirana employ the elite of the medical staff and offer
specialised treatments.
3 An additional explanation may
be the absence of social relations between patients and
physicians in a big city as Tirana.
The numbers of days in hospital had a significant and
negative influence on the amount paid informally (RC=-
0.033; p-value = 0.000). High utilization patients seemed
to exhaust their resources and/or became more familiar
with the informal system of paying. Moreover, estimates
showed that the higher the amount of informal pay-
ments, the more likely it was to be ‘explicitly requested’
(OR = 1.66; p-value = 0.000).
Patients paying for outpatient care were also likely to
pay for inpatient care (see Table 4). This suggests that
certain characteristics of patients highly influenced the
probability of payment for these services (correlation
coefficient = 0.648; p-value = 0.000).
4 However, informal
payments paid for inpatient care were not statistically
correlated to the amount paid for outpatient care (corre-
lation coefficient = 0.006; p-value = 0.966). Our survey
shows that the average amount paid informally for inpa-
tient care was several times higher than the amount
paid informally for outpatient care (see also Table 2).
Discussion
The results from the logit and OLS models are sum-
marised in Table 5. The table shows which of the three
models (cultural, economic and governance) offers the
best explanation for informal payments.
Our empirical findings suggested that informal pay-
ments were widespread in both outpatient and inpatient
care. Patients paid informally to medical staff either
because they felt that they should pay (voluntary) or
because they were obliged to do so (requested/
expected). This clearly supports both cultural and gov-
ernance models. However, we also found that determi-
nants of informal payments for inpatient and outpatient
care appeared to be different. These differences were
not only associated with the type of health care, but also
with the extent of coverage by health insurance. The
Health Insurance Institute had contractual agreements
covering only outpatient care, while inpatient care was
state-funded.
5 Patients were more likely to pay for inpa-
tient than for outpatient care (52.8% of them declared to
have paid for inpatient care compared to 23.3% for out-
patient care). This result contrasts with the cultural
model since this model predicts no differences in the
probability of informal payments for inpatient and out-
patient care.
The findings also suggested that patients with chronic
illnesses, the lower educated, or rural residents treated
in Tirana’s hospitals were more likely requested to pay
informally to medical staff. These findings are not in
accordance with the cultural model, but can be inter-
preted as empirical evidence in favour of the economic
and governance models. Because the government fails to
protect patients in these categories, they are exposed to
the rules of the market (If you need care you have to
Figure 1 Outpatient care - predicted probability of paying
informally by age group with and without health insurance.
Figure 2 Inpatient care - predicted probability of paying
informally by age group with and without health insurance.
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from patients in these categories points to an overall
lack of accountability in both outpatient and inpatient
care. This result supports the governance model.
The differences we found in the amounts paid infor-
mally in outpatient and inpatient care suggest that such
amounts may depend on the specific treatment. More-
over, estimates show that the higher the amount of
informal payments, the more likely it is to be ‘explicitly
requested’. These findings also support the economic
and governance models which conceptualise informal
payments as a fee-for-service and a consequence of
medical staff’s unethical behaviour as well as an ineffi-
ciently operating and poorly governed system.
The elderly patients were less likely to pay in outpati-
ent care than the younger ones. We argued that this
m a yb eb e c a u s et h e yw e r em o r el i k e l yt oh a v eh e a l t h
insurance (e.g. universal coverage for pensioners) and
belonged to lower income quintiles (World Bank, 2006).
The result contrasts with the cultural model, but is in
accordance with the economic and (partly) the govern-
ance model (the elderly make more visits but have bet-
ter insurance coverage and less financial resources).
The weak relation between patient’s income and prob-
ability of paying informally can be considered to be a
governance failure causing inequity in health care
(everyone has a certain probability for paying informally
regardless of income). However, the positive association
of income with the amount paid suggests that high
income patients pay more informally for health care.
This finding offers some support for the economic
model and is in line with other studies on informal pay-
ments in Albania [7].
An interesting finding was that patients with lower
rated health status were more likely to pay. This could
be explained by their income level and societal position.
As they belong mostly to lower income categories
(health negatively correlates with income), they may
have lower bargaining power and hence be more likely
to pay informally. However, we should consider that
they may have not paid for better service but for getting
access [4]. This could explain the lower amount paid.
These findings support the governance model according
to which medical staff requests informal payments more
often from vulnerable patients because of their lower
bargaining power.
The high dependence of informal payments on the
health insurance status in both outpatient and inpatient
care demonstrates again, that the most vulnerable are
also more likely to be exploited. Lack of governmental
protection and lower negotiating power make them
more vulnerable to informal payments. Higher educated
patients have more ‘information’ on how the health sys-
tem works, how much the medical staff gets, and how
much the additional services (or better services) cost. In
fact, having higher education may help in getting better
negotiating position with medical staff.
Although our study sheds more light on the demand
side of informal payments, it has some limitations
because of the available data. Albania LSMS 2005 does
Table 5 Main empirical findings and the evidence on the three models
Findings The social-
cultural model
The economic
model
The governance
model
1. Informal payments are widespread in outpatient and inpatient services. + - +
2. More patients (52.8%) pay informal payments in inpatient care than in outpatient care
(23.3%).
- + +/-
3. The amounts paid in inpatient are larger than in outpatient care (fee-for-service) - + -
4. Almost 61.7 of the payments in outpatient and 68.6% in inpatient care are expected or
requested.
-- +
5. Positive but not statistically significant association of per capita income with probability
and amounts of informal payments.
- +/- +/-
6. The elderly are less likely to make informal payments (especially in outpatient). - + +/-
7. Rural areas patients seeking care in Tirana are more likely to pay and to have been
explicitly requested an informal payment.
- +/- +
8. Vulnerable patients (higher ages and poor health rated) are more likely to pay in
inpatient care but not in outpatient care.
-- +
9. Higher amount paid in hospitals located in Tirana. - + -
10. Rural patients visiting Tirana’s hospitals are more likely to be requested to make
informal payments.
- +/- +
11. Higher educated patients pay more in inpatient care where the role of health insurance
is weak and services are more intense.
- + +/-
12. Primary education patients are requested to pay in inpatient services. - - +
Note: The positive and negative signs in the table indicate if the evidence found from the data analysis (logit and OLS models in Table 3) support or not each of
the models.
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physicians or other staff, nor does it capture the pay-
ments made in kind or through favours rendered. Our
analysis is based on the information on “gifts made to
medical staff”. The questionnaire does not ask explicitly
for the total amount of informal payments (which would
also include other payments, for example payments for
pharmaceuticals that otherwise were suppose to be free).
Furthermore, we are not able to determine to what
extent social connections (i.e. knowing the medical staff
beforehand) influence informal payments.
In this study we have mostly concentrated on patient
characteristics. The data gives limited information on
the behaviour of the medical staff. Information on the
hierarchical position of physicians or their particular
professional background would enable us to get more
insight into who is requesting and who gets what. More-
over, linking information on the culture towards infor-
mal payments in particular health centres or hospitals
(e.g. number of penalised staff for practicing informal
payments) would give a better overview of the rule of
law and its effects on the incidence and amounts paid.
Conclusion
In this paper we tested the cultural, economic and gov-
ernance models explaining the occurrence and extent of
informal payments. Taking into consideration that Alba-
nia is a Mediterranean country, we expected the cultural
model to be the best model for explaining informal pay-
ments. However, our data and results do not confirm
this expectation. Our findings provide more evidence for
the economic and governance models.
The economic model favours mostly a ‘fee-for-service’
description of informal payments. They fill the gap due
to lack of resources. The unequal amount paid for inpa-
tient and outpatient care, the low correlation of
amounts paid informally in both services and the higher
amount paid informally in hospitals located in Tirana
appear to support the economic model. Better trained
physicians (concentrated in Tirana’s hospitals) seem to
seek more financial rewards than their colleagues.
Higher educated patients pay more for inpatient care
where the role of health insurance is weak and services
are more intense. These findings may suggest that infor-
mal payments are meant to purchase better care.
It is difficult to draw a clear-cut diving line between
the economic and governance model. To some extent
they can be seen as a consequence of each other. Low
investments, a low budget for health care and inequal-
ities between rural and urban areas may imply some of
the main causes of informal payments. These factors
can be understood as motivating the medical staff to
request informal payments. Informal payments may also
be seen as the result of the lack of accountability and
the weak rule of law in Albania. Public authorities are
reluctant to take effective measures to punish them for
their behaviour. Lack of support to vulnerable groups (i.
e. chronically ill or uninsured) and low levels of infor-
mation further increase the negative effects of informal
payments for these particular groups.
Patients and physicians are using informal payments
as a coping strategy to ease problems caused by lack of
resources and poor governance [15]. We showed that
the burden of these payments falls mostly on the most
vulnerable groups in society. From a policy perspective,
the most effective measure would be to include inpati-
ent health care in the benefit package of the national
health insurance scheme. Widening the coverage of
health insurance and direct contracting inpatient care
would help to increase efficiency of health care provi-
sion. The implementation of this change has only
started in 2009. Its effects on inpatient care are yet to
be seen. However, the extension of health insurance to
inpatient care is not sufficient as a separate policy inter-
vention. It must be combined with policy measures to
protect the chronically ill and the uninsured. Experience
from other countries has shown that the formalisation
of informal payments alone has not eradicated corrup-
tion in the health sector [26]. It goes without saying that
the increased efficiency in financing health care system
would also require measures to improve the quality of
the services.
Endnotes
1 Albania LSMS 2005 gathers specific information on
gifts made to medical staff. Such gifts are considered
informal in Albania’sh e a l t hc a r ec o n t e x ta n da r en o t
allowed by the legislation in place. We have used this as
the best possible measure of informal payments in the
country for year 2005.
2 Due to the low prevalence of informal payments in
private doctors and dentist care we do not estimate
models for these private services.
3 This has created large inequalities between regions
in the access to quality services [22].
4 Based on the results of logit models, we can single
out health insurance as the most evident variable (nega-
tive and significant for both models): people without
i n s u r a n c ew e r em o r el i k e l yt ob ee x p l o i t e di nb o t h
services.
5 In 2005 the covered categories included those paying
contributions, pensioners, children 0-14 years old, stu-
dents, soldiers, disabled, unemployed and receivers of
social assistance.
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